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Democracy and the public 
In recent years, critics have raised well-founded concerns about extent to which 
surveillance may be affecting the health of democratic life. Practices of data 
collection and retention, as well as the unprecendented development of traceability 
through digital relational databases, have recently been addressed as sensitive 
topics in surveillance and society studies (Lyon 2007). Even without resorting to 
conspiracy theories or ‘Big Brotherist’ visions, which have already been effectively 
criticised by various scholars (see in particular Lianos 2003), concerns about a 
growing tension between the requirements for democratic life and the surveillant 
activity carried out by governmental agencies appear to be well founded. It is 
especially so if one takes into account the larger picture, which also includes the rise 
of ‘securitarian’ and ‘dangerization’ version of the law and order ideology. Waves of 
securitarian panic stirred up by moral entrepreneurs in Becker’s sense and mirrored 
by the media have led to racial targeting and racial profiling of groups seen as 
‘posing a threat’ to public safety (for the Italian case, see e.g. De Giorgi 2008). 
Concurrently, the growing motivational deficit at the heart of contemporary 
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democratic regimes (Critchley 2007) and the rise of economic inequalities are only 
too likely to multiply antidemocratic tendencies. 
 The public appears as a crucial dimension in the relationship between 
surveillance and democracy. However, a problem arises when, on the basis of an 
assumption that is grounded in political liberalism, the private is simply opposed to 
the public in a dichotomic way. Concerns about the political effects of surveillance 
are often interpreted as consisting in the task of protecting private life against 
surveillance. Throughout this chapter, I try to show the limitations of such view on the 
private/public divide. My argument is that we need to replace the false dichotomy of 
surveillance and privacy with a more nuanced and pluralist understanding of the 
social working of surveillance. Three main concepts will be at the centre of my 
discussion: visibility regimes, technologies of power, and the public domain. Visibility 
regimes will be described as constitutive of political regimes and as fundamentally 
interwoven with technologies of power. Because of this interplay, the idea of retreat 
into the private domain as a means of avoiding surveillance is chimerical. Rather, the 
real challenge posed by surveillance is the rearticulation of the public domain. It is in 
particular an Arendtian conception of democracy that, as I try to argue in the 
following, best captures this process, revealing the delusion inherent to the idea of 
being ‘free at one’s own place’. Once again, here technology plays a crucial role, not 
simply because power deploys a set of technologies but, more radically, because – 
following a Foucaultian insight – power itself is a technology, it is one among the 
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specific techniques that human beings use to undertand themselves (Foucault 
1982). 
 To begin with, it should be specified that in this context visibility cannot be 
reduced to a mere visual issue. Visibility is a symbolic field, in the sense that it is a 
field of social meaning: not simply do seeing and being seen correspond to given 
power positions, but also many other not directly perceptual forms of noticing, 
managing attention and determining the significance of events and subjects 
constitute visibility relationships. In short, visibility lies at the intersection of the two 
domains of aesthetics (relations of perception) and politics (relations of power). 
 From this perspective, to describe visibility as symbolic does not mean to 
equate it to a matter of cultural repertoire. Culture is indeed symbolic, but in the case 
of the visible the symbolic perspective should be taken and turned upside down, so 
to speak. Images and gestures do not so much constitute the perceptible symbols of 
some intangible meaning, but rather symbols are images and gestures, in the sense 
that they have the same structure and the same way of functioning. Symbols are 
nothing more and nothing less than what is made visible, and, complementarily, what 
makes the visible. Thus symbols are the material element of the visible as well as 
the identifiable Gestalten that are drawn in the field. The visible is not only the field 
where broad cultural meanings are worked out, but also a much more compelling 
material and strategic field. Visibility is not free-floating meaning, but meaning 
inscribed in material processes and constraints (see also Brighenti 2007). Visibility is 
a domain that is crucially located at the interface between the domains of the 
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technical and the social. Contemporary social-technological complexes are intimately 
linked to the forms and features of social visibility and intervisibility, as for instance 
mass media as collective apparatuses of social networking clearly reveal. 
 Social and political theorists have provided important conceptualisations of the 
public domain. Hannah Arendt (1958: § 2) insisted on the existence of a ‘world in 
common’ among humans as the pivotal condition for politics. In Greek and Roman 
culture, Arendt argued, it is the experience of the common that defines the public 
sphere as the place where ‘everything that appears . . . can be seen and heard by 
everybody and has the widest possible publicity. . . [and] appearance – something 
that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves – [is what] constitutes 
reality.’ (ivi, 50) The public sphere is defined by its publicity and commonality, in 
contrast to the private sphere, which is characterised by deprivation: ‘To live an 
entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly 
human life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by 
others.’ (ivi, 58) The existence of the public sphere as a world-in-common which 
joins and separates is, for Arendt, threatened by mass society, which undermines 
the capacity of the public to articulate meaningful relationships and separations 
among people. Such ‘meaningful separation’ speaks in fact to the Hegelian theme of 
recognition, which has been taken up for instance by Charles Taylor since the 70s 
(see Taylor 1989). In particular, Taylor argued that the sources of the subject in 
western political thought should be conceived taking into account not merely large 
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scale social projects (such as theories of justice etc.), but especially the personal 
desire for recognition as constitutive of life in common. 
 While in disagreement with Arendt’s thesis that modernity is a time of decline of 
the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas (1982 [1962]) similarly defined the public sphere as 
a realm of social life that provides a forum for the articulation of common issues. The 
public sphere emerged in modern society, over the period from the seventeenth century 
to the early nineteenth century, as a third domain, distinct from both private household 
and public power. The public sphere is the space of civil society, as distinct from private 
association on the one hand, and institutionalized political society on the other. Its 
specificity consists in providing the infrastructure for the elaboration of public opinion 
through public debate – that is, debate on matters of general interest and issues of 
common concern. Such debate is joined by all those citizens potentially affected by the 
outcomes of political decisions on the issues at stake. Participation and deliberation are 
the crucial aspects of this sphere of social action. Linked to institutions such as coffee 
houses, public libraries, and, above all, modern mass media such as the press, the 
history of the public sphere is the history of the consolidation of bourgeois society. The 
defining features of the public sphere are its essential accessibility to all citizens and the 
principle of the public availability of proceedings (Publizitätsvorschriften). Habermas 
also diagnosed a crisis of the public sphere during the course of the twentieth century, 
in the form of a ‘refeudalization.’ On the one hand, new powerful private actors, such as 
large corporations, started undertaking direct political action through control and 
manipulation of communication and the media, thus promoting their private interests in a 
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way that is at odds with the original logic of the public sphere. On the other hand, the 
Keynesian configuration of the western welfare state corresponded to a more active 
engagement of the state in the private sphere and everyday life, leading to an erosion of 
the distinction between political and civil society which was itself the object of criticism 
(see e.g. Young 1990). Following the Frankfurt School line of analysis, Habermas 
described the decline of the public sphere as a process of transformation of citizens into 
consumers, which eventually leads to a decline of interest in the common good and in 
direct participation. 
 In his theorisation of politics, Norberto Bobbio (1999) identified democracy as a 
type of power that poses a specific challenge to the older elitist tradition of the 
arcana imperii (literally, the secrets of power). The elitist tradition is grounded in a 
negative anthropology maintaining that there is no cure from the evil of power. In this 
view history is reduced to a contingent series of facts that do not alter the human 
being’s thrust towards power. Power is believed to have been, and to be necessarily 
always bound to be, in the hands of a minority, an elite which is not legitimated from 
below but rather legitimizes itself. Understandably, this bitter reality of power is often 
kept hidden to avoid contention and political turmoil. Arguably, conspiracy theories 
are an offspring of elitist theories, insofar as they extend the elitist belief in the – at 
least partial – invisibility of power to the idea of the invisibility of power holders 
themselves, organized in an invisible ruling synarchy. By contrast, Bobbio defines 
democracy as ‘power in public,’ i.e., power whose inner mechanisms are made 
visible and therefore controllable. Modern democracy was born in opposition to the 
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Middle Ages and early modern treaties on the art of government, such as the 
Machiavellian style ‘advices to the Prince.’ Whereas the precepts-to-the-Prince 
literature looked at power ex parte principis, from the point of view of the prince, 
modern democracy begins when one begins to look at power ex parte populi, from 
the point of view of the people. The gaze from below amounts to a vigorous call for 
the openness and visibility of power. Whereas all autocratic regimes are founded 
upon the conservation of secrecy in proceedings, the crucial democratic challenge is 
to achieve a deployment of power that is ideally without secrets. The device of 
political representation is necessarily public, as recognised even by opponents of 
this view, such as Carl Schmitt. For his own part, Max Weber (1978[1922]: I, §III, 3-
5) saw quite clearly that modern bureaucracy is an ambivalent institution. On the one 
hand, bureaucracy is necessary to achieve the legal-rational form of power, based 
on the specialisation of competences and the standardisation of procedures. 
Bureaucratic apparatuses are capable of attaining the highest degrees of efficiency 
and the most rational way to control people because they guarantee a high degree of 
calculability of outcomes. On the other hand, however, not only does bureaucracy 
produce conformity and uniform technical competence, but it also tends to breed 
plutocracy and dominance of formalistic impersonality, and, above all, it is constantly 
tempted to resort to restrictions to open access to government records, through the 
production of ‘classified’ documents (‘Amtsgeheimnisse’) and other inaccessible 
technicalities. These perils of technocracy have also been analysed by other 
democratic theorists, such as Robert Dahl (1989). Bobbio (1999: 365) himself 
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remarked that ‘the resistance and the persistence of invisible power become 
stronger and stronger, even in democratic States, the more one considers issues 
such as international relations,’ which often include secret consultations and secret 
treaties. 
 In spite of their differences, most social theorists share some concern for the 
transformations of the public sphere during the twentieth century. The shrinkage of 
the public sphere – which, as mentioned above, Habermas dubbed ‘refeudalisation’ 
– is regarded as threatening for democracy. In this respect, Graig Calhoun (2005) 
has observed that democracy requires both inclusion and connection among 
citizens; in other words, citizens should be able to access relevant information and 
communicate with each other in a common world which extends beyond primary, 
private associations. This is why the public sphere materialized first of all in urban 
environments, and was later extended by the media: ‘Publics connect people who 
are not in the same families, communities, and clubs; people who are not the same 
as each other. Urban life is public, thus, in a way village life is not. Modern media 
amplify this capacity to communicate with strangers.’ (ivi, 5) Hence, the importance 
of transparent and symmetric communication as constitutive of the public sphere. 
For Calhoun, indeed, the public sphere cannot be conceived as the mere ‘sum’ of a 
set of separate private opinions, for such conception deletes the fundamental 
process of the formation of public opinion itself, which takes place through 
discussion and deliberation.  
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 Overall, these theorisations point to the fact that the public sphere is a sphere of 
visibility. But whereas political philosophers insist in particular on the procedural and 
deliberative dimension associated with communicative action, sociologists must also 
study the specificities of public space and the types and modalities of interaction in 
public. Richard Sennett (1978), for instance, focused on the western urban space in 
order to locate the public sphere. He argued that it was the very transformation of 
modern city life that caused a crisis in the public realm. The construction of the public 
sphere was the construction of an impersonal, role-based model of interaction, which 
enabled people to deal with complex and disordered situations. The fall of this model is 
marked by the rise of a new emotivism and the thirst for authenticity, community, 
expression of feelings and desires. Indifference, concerns for personal safety, fear of 
victimisation, and a whole ideology of the ‘coldness’ of public space caused a general 
retreat into the private, in search for the ‘warm’ human relations supposed to be found in 
the family and the community. Emotivism and communitarianism thus induced a crisis in 
the dynamism of the public sphere as well as a decrease in ‘civility,’ understood as the 
capacity to relate positively to strangers (‘the activity which protects people from each 
other and yet allows them to enjoy each other’s company’ ivi, 264). In other words, the 
fall of the public man corresponded to an increasing fear of strangers’ intervisibility. 
Such incapacity to live with strangers, Sennett observed, is deeply problematic, 
because intimate relations cannot be successfully projected as a basis for social 
relations at large. Accepting the other as unknown is a crucial component of civility, 
which is a crucial democratic capacity, similar to what Castoriadis (1997) used to call 
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paideia. Castoriadis stressed that there is no ultimate guarantee for democracy, but only 
contingent guarantees. Paideia, or ‘education’ in a very broad sense of the term, is one 
such guarantee that consists in the creation of political subjects aware of both the 
necessity of regulation and the possibility of discussing, criticising and changing the 
rules of coexistence: ‘Rotation in office, sortition, decision-making after deliberation by 
the entire body politic, elections, and popular courts did not rest solely on a postulate 
that everyone has an equal capacity to assume public responsibilities: these procedures 
were themselves pieces of a political educational process, of an active paideia, which 
aimed at exercising – and, therefore, at developing in all – the corresponding abilities 
and, thereby, at rendering the postulate of political equality as close to the effective 
reality of that society as possible.’ (ivi, 11) 
 Sennett’s view of the public sphere shares some similarities with ideas emerging 
from interactionist sociology. Erving Goffman (1963, 1971) approached public space 
from the perspective of the specific type of interaction that goes on in public, made of 
fleeting encounters among strangers and small scale sociality. Working within a 
Goffmanian framework, Lyn Lofland (1998) has insisted on the elements of urban 
environments and stranger interaction as constitutive of the public realm at large. The 
public realm can be conceived of primarily as a type of register of human interaction 
which differs from other registers, specifically from the private one. Lofland contends 
that the realms she describes are social-psychological rather than spatial. The type of 
realm, in other words, is not defined by the physical space in which it is located but by 
its predominant relational form. Whereas the private realm is ‘characterized by ties of 
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intimacy among primary group members who are located within households and 
personal networks,’ and the parochial realm is ‘characterized by a sense of commonality 
among acquaintances and neighbors who are involved in interpersonal networks that 
are located within communities,’ the public realm can be described as ‘the non-private 
sectors of urban areas in which individuals in copresence tend to be personally 
unknown or only categorically known to one another.’ (Lofland 1998: 9-10)  
 Consequently, whereas in the private realm the dominant relational form is 
intimate, and in the parochial or communal realm it is communitarian, in the public realm 
the dominant form is essentially categorical. A categorical form of relation, which 
corresponds to the capacity to deal with biographic strangers, stems mainly from the 
experience of urban life and is based on the only apparently thin capacity to coexist in a 
civil manner, accepting the existence of social diversity. Thus, Lofland’s analysis 
advances an apology of the public realm on the basis of its social value as an 
environment for active learning, a site for relief from sometimes oppressive strong ties, a 
place where both social cooperation and social conflict can be acted out, and, 
ultimately, the only true place for social communication and the practice of politics. 
 
The public as visibility and territory 
Research on the public sphere and the public realm is greatly valuable for the study of 
the contemporary interplay between democracy and surveillance. But a further key 
element must be considered: that is, the interweaving of material and immaterial 
dimensions of the social sphere. Both political philosophers and interaction sociologists 
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tend to somewhat downplay the importance and scope of the materiality of the public, 
and, more precisely, the interweaving and constant prolongations of materialities and 
immaterialities. Indeed, political philosophical reflection on the public sphere is almost 
exclusively focused on the dimension of political participation and deliberative 
procedures, while interactionist studies of the public realm are mainly concerned with 
the cognitive frameworks and registers of interpersonal interaction. By doing so, 
however, both approaches miss the spatial and material constraints that constitute the 
public. 
 In an attempt to overcome the limitations inherent in such a selective and partial 
outlook on the part of political philosophers and interactionist sociologists, I propose to 
adopt the label ‘public domain’ as the most encompassing and general term to address 
issues traditionally associated in various ways with the public sphere, public realm, and 
public space. Here, I argue, visibility and territoriality emerge as key analytical points. 
First of all because, as we have seen, the public domain is itself open and visible. But 
not simply this: accessing the public domain also means accepting to become a subject 
of visibility, someone who is, in his or her turn, visible by others. Secondly, because the 
working of intervisibilities in practice amounts to the practice of introducing and 
managing qualitative thresholds between different types of events going on in the social 
sphere. The public domain, thus, can be fully appreciated only if we take into account 
the double articulation of the social sphere, as ‘matter of the cosmos’ and ‘image of 
thought’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980) at the same time. 
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 The public domain has both a material side, defined by bodily experience, 
density, circulation and urban dromology, and a social-relational, affective side, 
referring to the capacity of actors to affect each other. Consequently, we can 
conceive of the public domain properly as a territory (Brighenti 2006), that is, a 
specific modalisation of situated and materially constrained interaction. Territories 
are relational, processual and directional phenomena, which always exist in the 
tension between the material and the immaterial. They are like acts or events that 
unfold in time, creating determinations, trajectories and rhythms on the basis of 
threshold-making, or boundary-drawing acts. Not simply spatial regions, but every 
type of relational topologies can be appreciated as territorial formations, such as for 
instance the internet. Contrary to what has sometimes been superficially said about 
media without a sense of place, the internet is in fact a deeply territorial process, 
insofar as browsing constantly involves the experience of crossing boundaries and 
entering new territories made of relational fields defined by domains, access points, 
protocols, and then inclusion and exclusion, elicitation, participation, banning, and so 
on. Adopting a distinction first introduced by Michel de Certeau (1984), Mattias 
Kärrholm (2007) has recently remarked that territorial complexity is due to the 
balancing of the double process of territorial production and territorial stabilisation. 
Production and stabilisation can be either strategical or tactical in nature: ‘[t]erritorial 
strategies represent impersonal, planned, and, to some extent, mediated control, 
and often involve the delegation of control to things, rules, and so forth. Territorial 
strategies are (to a degree) always planned at a distance in time and/or space from 
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the territory produced, whereas territorial tactics involve claims made in the midst of 
a situation and as part of an ongoing sequence (in daily life). Territorial tactics thus 
often refer to a personal relationship between the territory and the person or group 
who mark it as theirs.’ (ivi, 441) The territorialising process can be described as a 
way of carving the environment through some boundary-drawing acts which 
concurrently help stabilising the set of relationships that take place in the 
environment.  
 Once boundaries are recognised as a type of operation, or ‘act,’ that leads to 
an initial definition of territories, trajectories and boundaries within and around 
territories should be conceived as complementary rather than conflicting elements, 
or, in other words, as two elements that constantly act upon each other. As every 
other territory, the public domain is bounded, but its boundaries are constantly 
worked upon by actors. One of the crucial processes that is currently reshaping the 
boundaries of the public domain in significant ways is the emergence of visibility 
asymmetries fostered by contemporary surveillance practices. Not only is access to 
many spaces being more and more restricted through the use of checkpoints and 
passwords, but the very type of categories produced by professional surveillance 
knowledge is intersecting with and even colonising lay knowledge in the public 
domain. 
 Visibility concurs crucially in the demarcation of the public domain. Specifically, 
the social configurations emerging from new surveillant visibility regimes are leading 
to a profound transformation of the public. Visibility is not merely a free-floating 
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aspect of social interaction. Rather, it is structured as the result of the activities and 
practices of all the different actors who aim to plan it or, on the contrary, to resist 
planning. Visibility asymmetries are arranged into structured complexes, which we 
call regimes. Contemporary society is organized around regimes of visibility that 
concur in the definition and management of power, representations, public opinion, 
conflict and social control. Whereas potential ambivalences are inherent to all 
visibility effects, actual regimes contribute to specify and activate contextual 
determinations of the visible. Thus, what selects the actual effects of visibility is the 
whole territorial arrangement in which social relationships are embedded. 
 The threat surveillance poses to democracy today can be related to the fact 
that the contract of visibility in the public domain is being increasingly blurred and 
ultimately revealed fictional: the normal and the abnormal, norm and exception 
cannot be disentangled. This fact, which we are going to discuss more in depth 
below, reminds us that the study of the public domain itself can be undertaken from 
at least two complementary if not opposing perspectives: the already considered 
perspective of democracy, on the one hand, and the perspective of government, on 
the other. The governmental perspective has been developed in the most original 
way by Michel Foucault. Government includes what is commonly referred to as 
policy and regulation, but is not limited to that. Foucault (1991[1978]: 95) described 
the activity of government in these terms: ‘[w]ith government it is a question not of 
imposing law on men, but of disposing things.’ Governmental activity thus works by 
defining subject positions inside a field made of strategically ‘disposed things.’ It is 
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important to notice that, with this definition, Foucault completely severs the activity of 
government from state apparatuses. What characterizes the period from the 
sixteenth to the twentieth century it is not so much the subordination of society to a 
central state apparatus (étatisation de la société), as it is a governmentalization of 
the State itself (gouvernementalisation de l’État). More generally, the governmental 
field is essentially a relational and, in the terms proposed above, a territorial field 
which can be sustained by very different types of institutional bonds. Besides, the 
materiality of things and spaces is essential for the exercise of this type of power.  
 Foucault’s interest in government emerged, as is commonly known, in the 
context of his study of the genealogy of modern power. Foucault is said to have 
diagnosed a shift from sovereignty to disciplinary society, and, later, to have 
revealed the crisis of disciplinary society which was the prelude to new forms of 
control such as security. This view has sometimes been supported with reference to 
Deleuze’s Postscript (1992[1990]), which, however, only described the crisis of the 
disciplinary model and the main features of the control model of power. But, in fact, 
in the period from the mid to the late 1970s, Foucault (1976, 1977[1975], 1997[1975-
1976], 1991[1978], 2007[1978]) elaborated a more complex and nuanced 
quadripartite image of power, where the different forms of power do not simply rule 
out each other, as is sometimes wrongly interpreted, but rather co-exist in subtle 
ways. In other words, his analysis should not be interpreted as a stage theory (first 
sovereignty, then discipline, then security) but rather a pluralist analytics of power 
forms. At the most general level, Foucault’s analysis is grounded in the idea that 
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modern power is not simply a negative, repressive power, but rather a positive power 
that assumes the function of ‘taking care’ of human life as a whole: ‘the modern 
human being is an animal whose politics puts into question his own life as a living 
being.’ (1976: 188)  
 Four major types of technologies of power are identified by Foucault, 
corresponding to four types of regulation and four ways of organizing social space. 
The first technology is sovereignty. Its aim is to guarantee the certainty of a territory, 
which is a juridical and jurisdictional bounded space. Sovereignty establishes 
hegemonic control over a spatial territory. Its infrastructure is law, a discursive device 
that works essentially through prohibition (legal philosophers confirm that forbidding 
is the original deontic form). Sovereignty is the technology Foucault explored to a 
lesser extent, since he regarded it as the classical model of power which had already 
been conceptualised by classical theorists and was in fact being increasingly 
infiltrated by the second and third types of technologies. What is interesting in the 
sovereign technology is the specific type of spectacle of power it sets up, especially 
in the form of parades, triumphal marches et cetera. As Tony Bennett (1995: 22) 
glosses in the case of museums, ‘the people, so far as their relations to high cultural 
forms were concerned, were merely the witnesses of a power that was paraded 
before them.’ 
 The second technology is discipline. Discipline is a modern creation, whose aim 
is to cultivate, engender and ‘orthopaedically’ correct individual habits. It is a form of 
‘microphysical’ power in the sense that it is exercised directly upon individual bodies. 
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The major disciplinary tool is the norm. The norm proposes a positive ideal, enforced 
within a clearly delimited institutional space, that enables to separate normal and 
abnormal subjects. Discipline thus follows the maxim of divide et impera: it divides 
up both subjects and space, it introduces boundaries and establishes enclosed 
institutions. Discipline acts upon confused multiplicities in an attempt to eliminate 
confusion, categorize subjects and enhance their conformity to the norm. Famously, 
discipline aims to produce ‘docile bodies.’ 
 The third type of technology is security. Security is not a single discipline but 
comprises a set of technologies whose general aim is to govern multiplicities in open 
spaces on the basis of actuarial devices. Such multiplicities cannot be pinned down to 
the individual level, so that security cannot be applied to individuals. Rather, security 
organises space according to a series of possible events that are to be managed and 
kept under control. Security aims to control events that are temporary and even aleatory 
to a degree. In order to do so, it conceives and organises the space as an environment, 
a system of possibilities, of virtualities that do or do not become actual. Whereas 
discipline aims to govern a multiplicity of subjects by impacting directly, singulatim, upon 
individual bodies – in order to control them, train them, or get them accustomed to the 
norm – security governs the multiplicity as an omnes, an undivided whole. Whereas the 
norm works by ‘normation’, security works by ‘normalisation.’ In other words, while 
within the disciplinarian framework people are classified by reference to a norm, setting 
apart the normal from the abnormal, in the securitarian framework people are treated as 
an undivided whole and the issue becomes operating an aggregate, statistical or 
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average normalized management of biological processes such as nutrition, health and 
so on. Consequently, if the object of the application of discipline is the body, the object 
upon which security is exercised is an entity called population. Population is not an 
individual but a global mass, a collective and statistical concept. As such, it exists only 
as a pattern within a grid of dimensions and variables, which include ‘impersonal’ events 
such as birth, death, production, reproduction, and illness. The population has no will, it 
is neither ‘a people’ in the classical political-philosophical meaning, nor an actor in the 
sociological sense of the word. It just shows certain tendencies that must be normalized. 
From this point of view, technologies of security define biopolitics, which is different from 
anatomopolitics, the technology of disciplinary power exercised on individual bodies. If 
the latter aims to shape an individual’s habits and its drives, the former can ‘only’ control 
aggregate tendencies, without shaping them from within. Discipline individualizes; 
biopolitics massifies. Biopolitics is a politics of life, but not of individuals; rather, it 
addresses ‘the multiplicity of humans as a global mass that is affected by overall 
processes that characterise its life.’ (Foucault 1997[1975-76]: 216) 
 The fourth set of technologies of power analysed by the later Foucault is the set of 
technologies of the Self (Foucault 1982). Despite the fact that Foucault ultimately 
concluded that his major interest throughout all his career was in fact the exploration of 
the emergence of the subject, for the purposes of our present discussion on surveillance 
and democracy we will take into consideration only the first three types of technologies. 
 
Visibility management and surveillance  
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Shaping and managing visibility is a huge task that human beings perform tirelessly. 
The management of visibility is embedded in social-technological complexes through 
which the phenomenological here-and-now of the local Umwelt is prolonged by 
means of activities of import/export. In other words, the media are devices for 
establishing connections between different Umwelten. Clearly, from such a 
McLuhanian perspective (McLuhan 1964), the media cover a much broader category 
than mass media. Indeed, the mass media correspond to only one among the many 
configurations or patterns of visibility. It is broadcast, or one-to-many communication. 
More broadly, following Régis Debray (2000), the mediation process can be 
described as a techno-social ‘middle realm’ in which the social and the technical 
meet and mix. Frédéric Vandenberghe (2007: 26) has summarised this mixing as the 
process through which ‘the spirit gets materialized into technology at the same time 
as the social gets organized into society and reproduced through history.’ 
Democracy itself is one such socio-technological complex. Ideals and discourses 
about equality and freedom are not just abstract philosophical amusements, but are 
in fact fixed in very intricate and often twisted ways into the material aspects of the 
social, down to the most concrete and apparently dull details of an office, its 
furniture, its application forms and the bureaucratic jargon spoken by its employees. 
Hence, the importance of the dimension of (in-)visibility in the social field.  
 Every time the mass media and new communication technologies enlarge or 
reshape the field of the socially visible, visibility turns into a supply and demand 
market. At any change in the field, the question arises of what being seen, and at 
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what price – along with the normative question of what should and should not be 
seen. These questions are never simply a technical matter: they are inherently 
practical and political. This means that, at every change in the field, the practice, the 
rationale and the scope of inter-visibilities is going to be problematized and the 
specific parameters, delimitations and dynamics of visibility are re-negotiated. 
Therefore, to understand the real stake of the management of visibilities we need to 
adopt and confront those two opposing, or at least complementary, points of view on 
the public domain, which are the democratic and the governmental. 
 Another crucial aspect is connected to the fact that mediation can enhance 
asymmetries in visibility. Surveillance comprises all those processes through which a 
target population is kept under scrutiny. As such, surveillance can be described as 
specific management of the relative visibilities and visibility asymmetries among 
people. Within the framework of the thesis of a passage from disciplinary societies to 
societies of control, it has been argued that contemporary society is characterized by 
the fact that surveillance becomes methodical, systematic and automatic (Virilio 
1994), rather than discontinuous, as was the case with the disciplinary technology of 
power. We no longer have virtual control – which was made possible by the 
internalization of the gaze on the part of the disciplined subject  – but rather actual 
control, made possible by new technologies and the availability of new types of high-
tech ‘unsleeping eyes.’ Information and communication technologies have multiplied 
the range and the scope of surveillance processes and have made these processes 
routine, rather than techniques applied in exceptional circumstances. 
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 More nuanced surveillance studies, however, have revealed that surveillance 
itself is not monolithic (Lyon 2007). Rather, it comprises a set of activities promoted 
by different agencies for different purposes. In this vein, Lianos (2001, 2003) has 
argued that contemporary institutional control is acentric and acephalic, perioptical 
rather than panoptical. In this hypothesis, postindustrial social control is aimed not at 
surveillance on the part of a single central authority but rather at the creation of 
differential individual positions of inclusion/exclusion as well as of the promotion of 
individualist competition for inclusion. However, it is still possible to say, whether it is 
exercised by a single or by multiple agencies, what remains common to all 
surveillance activities is a selectively focused attention paid to personal details that 
are monitored, recorded, checked, archived and retrieved. Enhancing the traceability 
of acts and events, information storage and data retention, which are enacted for the 
most diverse institutional aims, crucially create the possibility of retrospective 
investigation. A single surveillance process thus consists in the effort to achieve and 
subsequently manage the visibility of people’s identities and behaviors to the 
advantage of the specific agency promoting that surveillance activity, but the overall 
interconnections between the many surveillance systems generate outcomes that 
are often unpredictable in terms of the extent and the precision of tracking. In any 
case, it is clear that visibility is to be understood not merely as a visual condition but, 
in a broader sense, as the availability of personal data useful to compile general 
behavioral profiles. New surveillance technologies lead to a widespread diffusion of 
even uncoordinated control practices and systematically activate contextual visibility 
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asymmetries among those who scrutinize and those who are scrutinized both at the 
material-sensorial and the immaterial level.  
 Inside a visibility regime, it is necessary to explain how the classification (and 
territorialization) of surveilled people takes place in practice, understanding the ways 
in which relations of perception (the visual) and relations of power (the visible) 
prolong and constantly flow into each other. To identify the visual and bodily features 
that are employed for the categorical identification and profling of people entails 
explaining the whole social organization of visual perception inside a socio-technical 
diagram or apparatus. Professional savoirs are deployed in the perception of 
images, and surveillance is in most cases a professional activity. This fact holds 
crucial consequences for surveillance practices. One of the crucial and most striking 
characteristics of contemporary surveillant visibility regimes seems to be their 
uncertainty. It becomes more and more difficult for lay people to know the specific 
knowledge that will be applied to scrutinize them. Sometimes it may even be hard to 
determine which types of behavior would cause one to be profiled as posing a threat.  
 In order to stress the complex functioning of surveillance, that exceeds the 
process of the norm, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) described as ‘surveillant 
assemblage’ the mechanism of transposition of surveillance from the material to the 
immaterial level, which operates as flows: ‘[t]he surveillant assemblage does not 
approach the body in the first instance as a single entity to be molded, punished, or 
controlled. First it must be known, and to do so it is broken down into a series of 
discrete signifying flows. Surveillance commences with the creation of a space of 
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comparison and the introduction of breaks in the flows that emanate from, or 
circulate within, the human body.’ (ivi, 612) Just like the technologies of security, the 
surveillant assemblage addresses a type of control upon open space which 
qualitatively differs from that adopted for enclosed spaces. The surveillant 
assemblage is a visibility regime. Similarly, Lianos (2003: 423) has described 
contemporary institutional control as based on routine and even unintentional 
processes of de-subjectification: ‘institutional control is about the “de-subjectification” 
of the individual, who is being largely transformed into a fragmented user, since the 
object of control is to regulate exclusively the specific institutional shell of activity 
concerned each time.’ 
 The de-subjectified dividual, though, is only part of a wider picture. Space can 
be controlled dividually for instance through boundary policing. But whenever some 
redrawing of boundaries takes place, other technologies will eventually intervene, 
leading to re-subjectification and re-individualisation. These could be, for instance, 
repressive measures against single trespassers, but also, at the same time, work as 
orthopedic and even exemplary demonstration for non trespassers, for the law-
abiding majority. In these cases, the institutional, the administrative, the sovereign 
and the expressive intermingle. As Haggerty reminds us, the threat to democracy in 
this case comes from the rise of arbitrary and capricious forms of governance. 
Surveillance regimes make more things more visible, bring more practices to the 
attention of surveillance agencies, but they do so in ways that are not openly 
accountable, based as they are on professional savoirs that are themselves invisible. 
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There exists a greater threat than the fact that people are profiled by (relatively) 
invisible agencies: it is the fact that profiling criteria themselves are invisible. Such 
criteria may not necessarily be designed for evil purposes, such as for instance overt 
racial discrimination; on the contrary, they may simply mirror pragmatic short-term 
concerns that are linked to the organizational logic of the surveillance agency. But 
their unintended consequences can nonetheless be quite harmful to people, and 
even fatal at times. Whether we decide to call these outcomes errors or not, whether 
we decide to locate them in an Orwellian or in a Kafkaesque atmosphere, we should 
not be blind to the fact that they draw a bleak picture for democracy.  
 A pluralist analytics of the technologies of power that could foster research on 
surveillance should recognize that surveillance comprises different types of 
processes at once. Rather than understanding sovereignty, panopticism and security 
as historical overarching models that are subsequent to each other, whereby the 
newer replaces the older, we should regard them as analytical dimensions of power, 
visibility, control, and surveillance. More specifically, the contemporary surveillant 
visibility regime seems to lie somewhere in between juridical, anatomopolitical and 
biopolitical technologies. Different regimes selectively activate one or more of these 
three sets of technologies, which have different objects, different methods, and 
different rationales, but always determine and subsequently manage visibility 
asymmetries.  
 The concept of visibility regime allows us to explain surveillant practices not as 
mere external intrusions into privacy, but rather, more radically, as the emergent 
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internal organization of social relations increasingly by means of visibility 
arrangements. The notion of privacy inherits the same old problems as the classic 
liberal concept of social contract: both concepts presuppose a state of nature where 
property and/or privacy should exist before any subsequently intervening political 
dimension and social restraint. This view does not hold, given that social restraints 
are not subsequent but rather inherent to the concepts of property and privacy. The 
usual liberal dichotomy of private as opposed to public cannot explain the fact that 
visibility relationships effectively shape the domains of both the private and the 
public. 
 To fully understand the relationship between democracy and surveillance, then, 
we must complement the democratic perspective with the governmental perspective, 
and, more specifically, take into account all three technologies of power identified by 
Foucault: the juridical, the disciplinary (or anatomo-political) and the biopolitical. As 
for the juridical technology, while surveillance studies rightly focus on the 
technological aspects of surveillance practices, the legal processes inherent in 
surveillance should always be clearly borne in mind, given that the law functions as a 
powerful territorializing device. Inherent in the law is the practice of territorializing 
subjects and their relations. But not all can be captured through the juridical lens: 
disciplinary technology works in localized, enclosed institutions and exercises a 
direct grip on bodies. Some surveillant practices, such as the most famous panoptic 
device, work in this way. But the picture would be once again incomplete without 
taking into account the third layer, i.e. biopolitical technologies of security. For 
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surveillance is exercised in the open space of the public domain and is focused on a 
‘population’ which is regarded and scrutinized qua ‘dividual’ information flows. What 
matters, in the latter case, is control through exclusion and selective access. 
However, if security is de-subjectified, subjectification is provided, in two different 
guises, by law and the norms. If, in the case of the law, the subject is addressed 
mainly in order to be restrained, in the case of norms, s/he is addressed in order to 
be shaped and ‘educated.’ In short, the three linguistic devices that correspond to 
law, norm, and security are, respectively, prohibition, slogan, and password. 
Whereas the first is based on negative, directly repressive command, the second 
corresponds to a type of power that is positive in the disciplinarian sense, a power 
that wants to create unanimity among people around a norm that classifies them; 
finally, the third designates a situation in which classification is done not so much in 
order to correct deviants but only to exclude them, establishing a selective procedure 
of access to safe and wealthy territories. It is not difficult to see these devices at play 
in contemporary surveillance practices, and it is hoped that empirical research may 
document them in detail. 
 Ultimately, the outcome of this process is not easy to foresee because of the 
many different forces at stake. Neither as recognition, nor as control, is visibility 
linearly associated with empowerment or disempowerment. In fact, social-
technological complexes open up a range of possibilities for resistance, too. 
Resistance itself can be conceptualized as a visibility strategy. At times, resistance 
may aim to bring back into visibility (the political) what receded into invisibility (the 
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economic), as the struggle for the democratization of the media and, more broadly, 
of global institutions reveals. In many other instances, though, resistance takes the 
path towards hidden practices. Secrecy lies not only at the core of power, but also at 
the core of the possibility of escaping and opposing it. James Scott’s (1990) work 
reminds us that many forms of resistance actually avoid open confrontation with the 
structures and the official organization being resisted, but can nonetheless turn out to 
be quite effective. Resistance to surveillant visibility regimes is not confined to being 
reactive or merely oppositional. Resistance is not simply a struggle against visibility 
per se. On the contrary, resistance involves a transformative drive that actively 
rearticulates social-technological complexes and their respective visibility regimes.  
 From this point of view, resistance is much akin to democracy as 
conceptualised by agonist theorists Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, and 
Jacques Rancière. The latter, in particular, has argued that democracy is formed by 
all those practices that constantly oppose themselves to the shrinkage of the public 
qua common that is inherently brought about by government: ‘The spontaneous 
practice of all government tends to shrink this public sphere, to make it into its 
private affair and, for that purpose, to consign the interventions and the places of 
intervention of non-state actors to the side of private life. Democracy, then, far from 
being the form of life of individuals dedicated to their private happiness, is the 
process of struggle against this privatization, the process of enlarging the public 
sphere.’ (Rancière 2006: 299) 
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 To conclude, some crucial dynamics in contemporary society, ranging from the 
most immediate microinteraction in the public domain to the very redefinition of the 
boundaries of the public in social-technological complexes, can be explained as 
concerning, and fundamentally consisting of, visibility and territorial relations. In this 
context, a Foucaultian analytics of power forms can be quite important. Once again, 
it is important to stress that sovereignty, discipline and security do not represent 
successive historic eras. To think so is to make the mistake of taking the part for the 
whole. We do not live in a post-panoptic society. Discipline has not disappeared from 
our political horizon because of a new emphasis on security, just as sovereignty and 
law have not disappeared because of the appearance of disciplinary power during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The point would be even clearer if we had 
taken into consideration the fourth type of power formation, too, i.e. the technologies 
of the self. Subjects are as old as western civilization, and it would make no sense to 
speak of a ‘subject society.’ Power formations such as sovereignty, discipline, control 
and subjectivity constantly interact with each other and the relative balance of 
emphasis in a contingent situation should not lead us to overlook the compound 
nature of socio-technological complexes and the plurality of power forms they entail. 
It is hoped that a theoretical contribution that takes into account all these elements 
may foster further empirical research into the processes of management, struggle 
and resistance in the field of the visible as the ground for any sociological analysis of 
democratic social life in the public domain. 
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